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patibility" test in the Genocide opinion, the result may well be that
discussions of the United States reservation will no longer deal
with its wisdom or practicality, but rather, will be centered around
the question whether the reservation itself is not legally invalid;
or at least, whether the United States could not be open to serious
attack on this score, should we at some future date attempt to in-
voke its protection.
Morton Mendelsohn
JURISDICTION AND FREE SPEECH PROBLEMS
IN PEACEFUL PICKETING
The law of peaceful picketing, especially in view of the latest
set of decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court
and the New York Court of Appeals, presents an unusual array
of problems. The most important of these are the most basic: what
can be done about peaceful picketing, and who can do it? An at-
tempt will be made here to answer these questions, with special
reference to the latest important cases: Wood v. O'Grady1 for
the "what", Garner v. Teamsters2 and Construction Workers
v. Laburnums for the "by whom". By way of establishing land-
marks, it can be said that the first problem is largely tied up with
First and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of speech and Section
7 of the Taft-Hartley Act, while the second involves such concepts
as federal pre-emption and the jurisdictional criteria of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.
Concerning the conduct that may be restrained, the Supreme
Court has defined its conception of picketing in about a dozen
cases decided in the past fifteen years. After a few early cases in
which picketing was thought to be equatable with speech,4 it was
decided that picketing was really a complex activity, and that
speech was only one of numerous elements involved. However,
since speech is to a large extent a protected activity, it is neces-
sary to treat picketing with some deference, usually by attempting
in some way to balance the respective interests of management,
labor and the general public. If, for example, a statute is so
broadly drawn as to outlaw all picketing, thereby favoring man-
agement too highly over labor and the public, that statute is in-
1. Wood v. O'Grady, 307 N. Y. 552; 122 N. E. 2d 386 (1954).
2. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U. S.
485 -(1953).
3. United Construction Workers Affiliated with United Mine Workers of America
v. Laburnuni Construction Corporatin. 347 U. S. 656 (1954).
4. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S.
106 (1940).
5. Infra notes 8-26.
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valid. This was decided in Thornhill v. Alabama6 and Carlson v.
California,7 and it is about all that those cases stand for today; to
this extent they are still perfectly good law.
For similar reasons, since freedom of speech is not restricted
to any particular group of persons, the decision in A. F. of L. v.
Swing," that stranger picketing must be allowed, was on firm
ground. The curious thing about this case is that both manage-
ment and labor seem to look upon it as a victory for labor. View-
ed from another standpoint it would seem to be actually a con-
cession to management, because it narrowed rather than broad-
ened the potential membership of a picket line. What the court
said was that freedom of speech could not be denied to persons
who had a common bond of economic interest with the picketed
employer,' and that a union of beauty parlor workers might prop-
erly picket a beauty parlor. One may infer, however, that absent
this common economic bond a picket line might be enjoined, and
that if the picket line in the Swing case had been composed of
musicians the Court might not have found the necessary bond.
This -sort of philosophy flowered into a general prohibition of sec-
ondary boycotts in the Taft-Hartley Act,' six years later.
In point of time, the next interesting development came in Car-
penters v. Ritter," wherein it was decreed that picketing might be
confined within a certain locale, that of the business with which
labor was having an argument. Thus picketing, which had ap-
parently started out as pure speech, now found itself restricted
both as to who could man the picket line and where the line could
be set up. In addition, injunctions were freely granted where the
picket signs were untruthful or misleading.'2 Coupled with the
principle that the courts could enjoin mass's or violent 4 picket-
6. Supra note 4.
7. Ibid.
8. American Federation of Labor v. Sving, 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
9. "A State cannot exclude working men from peacefully exercising the right of
free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition . . . so small as to
contain only an employer and those directly employed by him. The interdependence
of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace."
Id. at 326.
10. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) ; 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4) (A),
(Supp. 1952).
11. Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe,
315 U. S. 722 (1942).
12. Parkinson Conpany v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581; 98 Pac. 1027
(1908) ; Hotel and Railroad News Co. v. Clark, 243 Mass. 317, 137 N.E. 534 (1922) ;
Nan, v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. B. 690 (1931). For perhaps the most. extreme
case, see Sapersein v. Rich, 202 Misc. 923, 114 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. Ct. 1952).
13. N. L. R. B. v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F. 2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945) ; W. T. Raw-
leigh Co. v. N. L. R. B., 190 F. 2d 832 (7th. Cir. 1951) ; N. L. R. B. v. Perfect Circle Co.,
162 F ,d 566 (7th Cir. 1947).
14, N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 -U. S. 240 (1939) ; N. L. R. .B.
v. Stackpole Carban Co., 105 F. Zd 167 (3d Cir. 1939).
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ing, including picketing which was now peaceful but which had
been violent in the past, 5 the idea began to emerge that perhaps
the speech factor in picketing was not quite so important as had
been supposed. This would seem to date the swing away from a
carte blanche to labor somewhere in the early '40's, a little earlier
than most observers tend to place it. Teamsters v. Wohl'0 and
Union v. Angelos' 7 camouflaged the trend to some extent, but ac-
tually they come to no more than an affirmance of the basic doc-
trine in Thornhill v. Alabama:8 states may not outlaw all picket-
ing, especially not that particular kind which is entitled to consti-
tutional protection. 19
The trend toward a freer injunction policy was strongly spot-
-lighted by Giboney v. Empire0 in 1949, in which a group of union
ice peddlers was enjoined from picketing a wholesaler in an at-
tempt to stop him from selling to non-union peddlers. This con-
duct was held to violate the anti-trade-restraint statute of Mis-
souri, and the court said that there was no constitutional right
in picketers to utilize freedom of speech to violate valid state
laws. This conception was quickly confirmed (though there was a
further suggestion in the Giboney opinion which has apparently
not been fully explored)2 by Hughes v. Superior Court22 which
sustained an injunction based on a state policy against racial dis-
15. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
16. Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942).
17. Cafeteria Employees Union, Local No. 302 v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943).
18. Supra note 4.
19. In the Wohl and Angelos cases, the lower court enjoined after dispensing
with Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act on the customary ground that no "labor
dispute" was involved. The Supreme Court held that the C. P. A. was not the only
hrdle in -thi-ay of a free grahting of injunctions by the State courts.
20. Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Company, 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
21. What the Giboney opinion solidified in the law was the conception of picketing
as a congeries of activities, rather than as a homogenious phenomenon. Considerable
stress is placed upon the fact that carrying the placards was only part of a whole,
other parts of which included marching with the placards, being a union, and so on.
In essence, the entire course of conduct was nothing more than a normal case of picketing,
and the conclusion seems almost unavoidable that a court could enjoin nearly all picket
lines on the basis used for enjoining this one. The following quotations are typical.
"But the record here does not permit this publicizing to be treated in isolation
[T]he sole immediate object . . . was to compel Empire to agree to stop selling ice
to nonunion peddlers. Thus all of appellants' activities [four are listed, common to all
picket lines] . . . constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, Which wad in
violation of Missouri's valid law. .. "
"But placards used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave offense against an
important public law cannot immunize that unlawful conduct from state control.
Since the test of a "clear and present danger of a substantial evil" test may be used
as a basis for the denial of such constitutional rights as those of free speech and press,
'the Court worried its way around the problem as follows:
"There was a clear danger, imminent and immediate, that unless restraiffed,
appellants would succeed in'making that policy a dead letter . . ......
22. Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U. S. 460 (1950).
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crimination, and Teamsters v. Hanke23 which sustained an injun,
tion based on a state policy that a single proprietor without en.-
ployees need not be forced into operating as a union shop. These
two cases also stand for the proposition that the public policy of
the state may be announced by the courts as well as by the legisla-
ture, at least so long as it is not so inconsistent with tradition as to
be patently illegal.24 Union v. Gazzanve5 and A. F. of L. v. Gra-
ham20 followed these leads, the statute in the Gazzam case being
one which made it illegal to coerce an employer to force his em-
ployees to join a union, and that in the Graham case a state right-
to-work law.
So far as New York is concerned, Goodwins v. ITagedor,2 7 fol-
lows the logic of the Gazzam case as does, Metropolis v. Lewis,"8
the first Chic Maid29 case, and others. In view of this history,
Wood v. O'Grady" need come as no surprise. There the union
had been picketing a retail liquor store for two years, in an effort
to induce the three employees to join. The Court of Appeals,
in a 4 to 3 decision, refused an injunction. This would seem to
establish organizational picketing as a legal operation no matter
how long it has been carried on at one place of business or how
many employees are involved. However, this particular case
seems not to be as decisive as would first appear. The first
problem as to the opinion of the court is that it speaks for only
two judges; Judge Desmond concurred in a separate opinion,
and Judge Fuld agreed with the result in still another opinion.
The three dissenters united in one opinion. In the second place,
the case is seriously weakened by the fact that the employer
alleged no damages,"' much less the irreparable damages that are
usually reckoned a sine qua non in injunction cases. Finally, the
employer threatened to fire his employees if they joined the union,
made numerous disparaging remarks in public about the umion,
and engaged in similar forms of conduct to the extent that he
23. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470 (1950).
24. ". . . we cannot conclude that Washington . . . has struck a balance so
inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people that it must be found an unconsti-
tutional choice." Id. at 478-9.
25. Building Service Employees International Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339
U.S. 532 (1950).
26. Local Union No. 10, United Assn of Journeymen, Plumbers and Steamfitters
of U. S. and Canada of A. F. of L. v. Graham, 345 U. S. 192 (1953).
27. Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. 2d 697 (1951).
28. Metropolis Country Club Inc. v. Lewis, 202 Misc. 624, 114 N.Y. S. 2d 620
(Sup. Ct) ; aff'd 280 App. Div. 816, 113 N.Y. S. 2d 923 (2d Dep't 1952).
29. Chic Maid Hat Manufacturing Co. v. Korba, 281 App. Div. 1004, 121 N. Y. S.
2d 354 (4th Dep't 1953).
30. Supra note 1.
31. 307 N. Y. at 537, 541, 122 N. E. 2d at 388, 390.
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was guilty of at least one unfair labor practice himself, and
thus could not be said to have presented himself before the court
with clean hands3 2 . Had any damages been alleged, or had the
employer come into court with clean hands, the tenor of all the
majority opinions suggests that the result might have been dif-
ferent, and that the court might have looked a little harder to
find recognitional picketing if no other method for allowing the
injunction had offered itself. It is true that the union won this
case, but it is also strongly urged that management visions of
a return to the unhappy Thornhill days are unduly pessimistic.
One final problem along this general line arises in businesses
which come under the Taft-Hartley Act. It has been suggested
that perhaps Section 7 of the Act should be read to mean that
at least organizational picketing is to be regarded as specifically
protected. The theory is that Section 7 states certain rights of
unions, and Section 8 implemented by Section 10 protects them.
Stated another way, there are certain practises for the commission
of which an employer may discharge an employee with impunity.
Since peaceful picketing is not one of them, it should follow that
the employer may not accomplish by one method that which he
is not allowed to do by another, and enjoin conduct for which
he would not be allowed to discharge an employee. By this last
phrase, the criterion may be applied to cases of stranger picketing;
if the conduct involved is not such as would permit an employer
to discharge an employee, then regardless of whether it is com-
mitted by an employee or a non-employed union member the
issuance of an injunction is impliedly forbidden.
While the argument is ingenious, it seems to come perilously
close to begging the question. Parenthetically, the Section refers
to self-organization, and underscores the employee's right to
remain aloof from all union activity. Apart from this, presumably
Section 7 means simply that otherwise legal acts will not be
viewed as illegal because they are concerted. On the other hand,
it seems equally true that acts otherwise illegal will not be made
legal by concert. Thus Section 7 protects nothing but "legal"
picketing, and the question of what sort of conduct this embraces
still remains to be answered.
To summarize, then, it would seem that picketing is subject to
injunction any time that either the method or the motive of the
picketing interfere with a valid state law or policy. The next
question is that of which fora have jurisdiction to issue the in-junction. We are faced at the outset with the necessity of deciding
32. Ibid.
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what interstate commerce may mean in this field, since by its
terms the Taft-Hartley Act applies only to businesses. in interstate
commerce33. Ever since Wickard v. Filburn4, the answer has
seemed to be that interstate commerce embraces a large number of
businesses, down to and including a local box manufacturer35,
and potentially the N. L. R. B. can exert its jurisdiction over the
entire field. Actually, the Board is declining jurisdiction over an
increasing number of cases, and thereby creating an important
question: do the states have authority to step into the gap, or
do they not? Even more important, in view of the comparative
difficulty in obtaining Board injunctions vis a vis state court
injunctions, is the question whether the Board must be offered
first chance at labor cases, allowing the state courts to take only
what is left, if, indeed, they may do even that. These are both
questions of what is loosely called federal pre-emption, which finds
its mainspring in the Supremacy clause of the Constitution 8 .
Since it is here suggested that state courts may not only step
into the gap but may even precede te Board, it will be necessary
to look into this matter with some care.
Federal pre-emption is really not one doctrine but three 7 , and
the confusion of these three has produced some curious decisions.
The first phase of pre-emption is illustrated when a state statute
or policy conflicts with a federal statute or policy. This was the
situation in Bethlehem v. N. Y. S. L. R. B.3 , La Crosse v. W. E.
R. B.39, Hill v. Florida4 0 , and International Union v. O'Brien1, all
of which are widely cited as illustrative of federal pre-emption.
Here of course the state statute must fall.
The second phase of pre-emption occurs when a state statute
duplicates a federal statute; when it outlaws the same conduct
for the same reason that the federal statute proscribes. As Mr.
Justice Holmes said,
33. Section 1 (b).
34. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942).
35. Westport Moving and Storage Company, 91 N. L. R. B. 902, 26 L. R. R. M.
1581 (1950), in which the Board took jurisdiction over an individual proprietorship
in Kansas City, Missouri, which had two employees engaged in making packing boxes
for Fifth Army Headquarters to use in shipping the personal effects of military personnel.
The employer's gross annual receipts during 1949 amounted to about $21,000.
36. U. S. CoNsT. Art. 6.
37. See Note, 60 HA.v. L. REv. 262 (1946).
38. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S.
767 (1947).
39. La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U.S. 18 (1949).
40. Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538 (1945).
41. International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454 (1949).
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When Congress has taken the particular subject in hand, coinci-
dence is as ineffective as opposition . 42
Here again the state statute falls. The latest important example
of the operation of this theory can be found in the frequently cited
case of Building Trades v. Kinard.
43
The third, and most dramatic, phase of the pre-emption doc-
trine occurs when the federal government "occupies a field".
What this means is that if the federal government has legislated
extensively in some particular field, but a kind of activity later
arises which the government has neither protected nor proscribed,
the states are nevertheless barred from taking any action on the
matter themselves. The general rationale is that the federal gov-
ernment has done such an exhaustive legislative job that any
conduct they have not prohibited must be deemed to be impliedly
protected. This is of course a very sweeping doctrine, and courts
are generally reluctant to apply it unless Congress has clearly
indicated that occupation was what it had in mind44 ; this is par-
ticularly true in matters which are essentially local (as opposed
to national) in nature, as Cooley v. Port Wardens", indicated
some time ago. Occupation necessarily implies a no-man's-land
in the law, conduct which can be regulated on neither a state
nor a federal level, and gaps of this nature should not be pre-
sumed to exist without clear Congressional direction.
As applied to labor cases, no one will be disposed to deny
the doctrine of pre-emption as far as the first phase is concerned,
or even the second, but this leaves the occupation theory open to
question. For a while it seemed that the late Mr. Justice Jackson
had resolved this question in favor of occupation, in his famous
dictum in the Garner case:
The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of speci-
fied types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing
is to be free of other methods and sources of restraint. For the
policy of the National Labor Managefient Relations Act is not
to condemn all picketing, but only that ascertained by it pre-
scribed process to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is
42. Charleston R. Co. v. Varnville Co., 237 U. S. 597, 604 (1914); quoted in
Bethlehem v. N. Y. S. L. R. B. at 775-6, supra note 38.
43. Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U. S. 933 (1954),
reversing 258 Ala. 500, 64 So. 2d 400 (1953).
44. The case of Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148 (1942), illustrates
the outer limits which this theory may attain. Even as to this case it can be said
that occupation would probably not have been found if the conduct which the state
sought to prevent was not already subject to prevention at a different stage by the
federal government.
45. Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
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implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom
of labor to use the weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge
on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much
an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare
picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal act
prohibits. 46
Here seemed to be almost a classic statement of the occupa-
tion theory, to the great discomfort of management. The con-
comitant rejoicing of the Unions, however, lasted only a few
months. In the interim the Supreme Court had time to consider
this pronouncement, and to cast its eye over a rather respectable
series of decisions in which state court injunctions had been sus-
tained, among them Allen Bradley v. W. E. R. B. 47, Aigoma v.
W. E. R. B.48, and the Briggs-Stratto 9 case. Re-examination of
the Garner case itself also produced the following:
This is not an instance of injurious conduct which the National
Labor Relations Board is without express power to prevent and
which therefore either is "governable by the State or it is en-
tirely ungoverned". In such cases we have declined to find an
implied exclusion of state powers.8 0
The stage was thus set for some "clarification" when the
opportunity presented itself in Construction Workers v. Labur-
num51 , and essentially the same Court which had concurred unani-
mously in the Garner case came forth with the following:
The care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing
conflict between state and federal administrative remedies in
that case was itself a recognition that if no conflict had existed,
the state procedure would have survived . 52
The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by the
State of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded
by federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or
conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be
reconciled or consistently stand together.53
This reduced the doctrine of federal pre-emption to its first
and second phases at most, and expressly denied the doctrine of
federal pre-emption as far as occupation of the field of labor law
46. 346 U. S. at 499-500.
47. Allen Bradley Local No. 111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U.S. 740 (1942).
48. Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U. S. 301 (1949).
49. International Union U. A. W. A., A. F. of L. v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
50. 346 U. S. at 488.
51. Snpra note 3.
52. 347 U.S. at 663.
53. Id. at 663.
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is concerned. Thus it would seem that a cogent argument could
be made, when the N.L.R.B. has declined jurisdiction over a case,
that the state is in no way precluded from stepping into the breach
if the only bar to such action would be the existence of federal
occupation of the field, a doctrine which apparently does not exist
in labor law.
If this is true, then the following state of affairs becomes
important. Soon after the "old" N.L.R.B. was formed it found
itself buried under a staggering avalanche of cases. Since ad
hoc declination of jurisdiction seemed inefficient, various memo-
randa were issued concerning the jurisdictional standards of the
Board. Presumably these were for the benefit of potential liti-
gants, but they soon lost most of their value as the Board over-
stepped its own bounds in both directions, declining cases which
seemed to fall within its jurisdictional ambit 4 and asserting its
power over cases which seemed to have been declined in the memo-
randa. 5 In addition to driving their own chief counsel to dis-
traction,56 this conduct gave the courts little reason to put much
faith in the standards for purposes of their own guidance.
This situation has now changed, though to what extent re-
mains a question. The three Eisenhower appointees who consti-
tute a majority are apparently extremely interested in setting
their jurisdictional standards high and keeping them there. The
current set of memoranda certainly illustrate the former thesis,
by almost uniformly doubling the monetary minima (which must
be involved before the Board will accept a case) over the stand-
ards of the previous memoranda. 7  As to the second point, Board
members have publicly declared their policy in various speeches 8
54. In Hotel Association of St. Louis, 92 N. L. R. B. 1388, 27 L. R. R. M. 1243
(1951), the Board refused to take jurisdiction over an association of hotels in a repre-
sentation case despite the fact that the members of the association annually received
$2,400,000 from out-of-state guests, annually bought over $800,000 in supplies shipped
from points outside the state, and that several of the members were units of large
multistate hotel chains.
55. Supra note 35.
56. Taft-Hartley Act: Suggested Amendments, 23 TENN. L. Rav. 121 (1954),
by former General Counsel Robert H. Denham.
57. Press Releases of National Labor Relations Board of June 30 and July 15,
1954. See 5 LABOR L. J. 571 et seq. (1954).
58. "Uncle Sam's long arm has reached out to assert itself over too many labor-
management situations which ought to be resolved closer to their origin. For example,
during the past fiscal year, more than 14,000 cases were filed with the Board. More
than 10% of these cases involved retail establishments alone; and a very large pro-
portion of the 14,000 cases involved businesses which employed fewer than twenty
employees. This despite the fact that the Board has rightfully taken the position that,
whatever may be the reach of its legal jurisdiction, it will refuse to exert jurisdiction
in enterprises essentially local in character." Address delivered at the Fourteenth Anntal
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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It is still too early to know whether the Board will adhere
to its new jurisdictional standards, though it seems that they
have done so to date, and of course no one will claim that memo-
randa issued as press releases have the force or effect of law.
On the other hand, courts will probably be reluctant to keep send-
ing cases to the Board only to have them sent back some time
later. If this is true, and if we grant the non-existence of federal
occupation of the field, it would seem to follow that, at least as, to
cases in interstate commerce which patently do not measure up
to the Board's published jurisdictional standards, there seems to
be no reason at all why the state courts should not assert their
powers even before the Board is offered the opportunity to declinejurisdiction, as well as afterwards.
Concerning the larger businesses, which come within the
Board's jurisdiction, there is yet another theory which may allow
them to invoke the jurisdiction of the state courts as well as that
of the Board. In order to follow this line of argument, it would
probably be well to examine the Laburnum59 case a little more
closely. The Laburnum Company recovered both compensatory
and punitive damages from a state court, in spite of the fact that
the company came within the jurisdiction of the Board. The rea-
son, it seemed, was that the Board did not have the power to grant
damages; therefore, since the Taft-Hartley Act did not abolish
damage actions, the state court was the only forum that could
properly exercise jurisdiction over the matter, though if the rem-
edy sought had been an injunction the Board would have had
exclusive jurisdiction. This is the usual interpretation of the case,
and it may very well be correct, but one or two points arise which
present rather thorny problems. Judging by Section 8 of the Act,
the Union had committed an unfair labor practise; moreover, it
seems to have been unfair under more than one subdivision of
that Section. In fact, there is even a suggestion that there were
aspects of secondary boycott involved, though the requirement that
there need be "concerted" action in secondary boycotts is ex-
tremely difficult to prove under the current interpretation of the
word. For the purpose of illustration, however, let us suppose
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
Institute of the College of Law of the University of Tennessee, Nov. 6, 1953, by Chairman
Guy Farmer of the N. L. R. B. Reprinted in 23 TENN. L. Ray. 112 (1954).
Member Rodgers, in a speech of his own which was of much the same tenor,
spoke in favor of a policy of refusing to assert jurisdiction in those cases which do
not have a "clear, substantial, and obvious impact on the national economy". Address
before the Retail Dry Goods Association, New York, N. Y., Jan. 12, 1954. Reprinted
in part 33 L. R. R. 207-9.
See Summers, Politics, Policy Making and the N. L. R. B., 6 SYRAcusE L. Ry.
93 (1954).
59. Supra note 3.
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that a secondary boycott situation was present, along with several
other unfair labor practises; the difficulty that arises is Section
30360 of the Act, which specifically provides for damage suits for
secondary boycotts. One of four plans must be adopted in such
a situation. Either the Board has exclusive jurisdiction of the
whole case, or the state court or district court may exert juris-
diction over the whole case, or the various bits and pieces of the
case must be shared among the various courts. The first of these
alternatives is manifestly unjust, since the Board has no jurisdic-
tion to handle damage suits, and this is what was decided in the
Laburnum case. The last alternative is burdensome and inequit-
able, though it might seem to follow necessarily from the idea
that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the matters that it
can handle, and other courts must be content with the remainder.
Nor can the district courts invariably take the case, since the
jurisdictional requirements are only waived in cases of secondary
boycotts. 61 The only sensible course, it is suggested, is that the
state court take jurisdiction over the entire matter. If a second-
ary boycott was in fact involved in the Laburrum case, that is
what actually happened. Assuming that this is a reasonable way
to dispose of the case, the next problem which arises is obvious.
We have been speaking so far about cases which involve multiple
unfair labor practises as defined by the Taft-Hartley Act; what
of cases which involve one or more such practises, but also some
other practises on the part of the defendant which, though not
specifically unfair by Section 8, nor specifically protected by Sec-
tion 7, are nonetheless prima fade undesirable and contrary to
some policy of the state within which they are committed. Sup-
pose, for example, that a union picketed a barrel maker to force
him to:
1) Discharge the only non-union worker at the plant, who
had been refused admission to the union because he was a
Negro.
2) Refrain from buying barrel hoops from his usual sup-
plier, because of a dispute between the supplier and the
union.
3) Alternatively, to force the barrel maker out of business.
Picketing with these objectives would not be inconceivable,
but it raises a series of questions. By reason of the first two
60. 29 U. S.C. § 187 (Supp. 1952).
61. "Whoever shall be injured . . . by . . . any violation of subsection (a) of
this section may sue therefore . . . without respect to the amount in controversy
Subsection (a) deals with various sorts of secondary boycott.
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objectives, the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the Board,
though it could not offer the remedy of damages for the first.6 2
For the third the Board could offer no remedy, but a state court
might well be interested in enjoining such action, on a prima facie
tort basis if nothing else. 3 In addition, a state might not look
kindly on the first motive.6 4 The mere allegation that such prac-
tises were involved would not be enough to allow the state court
to encroach on N.L.R.B. territory, and if the Garner case means
anything at all it means that state courts can not take jurisdiction
over disputes which could go to the Board if their only reason for
so exerting jurisdiction is the same reason that the Board has.
But if the reason is different, what then?
Let us consider an analogous problem in a more familiar
field; suppose a mail truck were robbed. There is no question
that the federal government could prosecute the offenders for
interfering with the federal mails and their jurisdiction -would
be exclusive; the state could not prosecute for this reason. On
the other hand, New York could prosecute for commission of the
crime of robbery, and their jurisdiction over this matter is ex-
clusive; the federal government clearly could not prosecute for
such a crime. Is there any reason why a similar theory could
not be applied in the case of a union peacefully picketing with
the motives suggested above? The Board could enjoin the picket-
ing because it constituted two unfair labor practises under the Act,
and as to this their jurisdiction would be exclusive, as in the
Garner case. But it is suggested that the state could enjoin if
it wished to, on the basis of the other conduct, totally separate
and irrelevant as far as the Act is concerned, which constitutes
a prima fade tort or some recognizable flouting of state policy,
so long as it was made clear that the injunction was grounded on
these facts-and not onthose by reason of WIich'the N. L. R. B. coult
have issued an injunction. Like'the. ihail rbbbery, both injunc-
tions depend on the same transaction and occurrence, but the facts
are slightly differently arranged in each case, since one complex
action runs afoul of the standards of the two distinct" jurisdic-
tions. The idea that it is necessary in all cases to exhaust the
administrative remedies- before going- to the courts is irrelevant;
there is no administrative remedy for picketing with the'intent to
force an employer out of business.
62. Supra note 60; Construction Workers v. Laburnum, supra note 3.
63. The'customary jliraseology is that "harm intentionally don& is actionable if
--not justified". "Anterican Guild of Musical Artists-v. Petrillo, 286 -N. Y.-226," 231; 36
.N: E..2d 123,-125 (1941). For a- -more -extended treatment-of what seems to-be the
same philosophy,- sie Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Web r,- 285: N. Y. 348, 355; 34 N. E. 2d
349,-352 (1941). • ..... . .
64. Cf. Hughes v. Superior Court supra note 22. .- .... -
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All this is entirely consistent with the Garner, Kinard, and
Laburmom cases. In the Garner case the only conduct with which
the union was charged was violating a state statute, which was
practically identical with the Taft-Hartley Act,65 and was there-
fore void by the second phase of the pre-emption doctrine. In
the Kinard case, the entire basis for the injunction was the Act
itself, with the local courts usurping the function of the Board.0
Ifsome other motive had appeared in either of these cases, apart
from those listed in the Act, the result might have been more
along the lines of the Laburnuwn case. While there may have been
no conduct in that case which was not covered by the Act, the
remedy asked for was not available from the Board. There would
seem to be no reason not to claim that in any picketing case where
either the motives or the remedy are beyond the jurisdiction of
the Board, then the state court may exert jurisdiction, even if the
Board could hear the case because of other motives involved or
alternative remedies requested.
On a practical level, if this general theory is at all tenable,
the management lawyer is faced with the problem of proving a
motive on the part of the union which is not one of those listed
iw Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the union must picket
in a manner which would make such proof impossible. In the past
such items as the picket signs, letters, and other communications
have been used to some effect.67 If nothing else serves, counsel can,
at least allege such motives; if the state court finds the allegations
to be true it would seem that it could enjoin the picket line regard-
less of the interstate aspect of the business, because the N.L.R.B.
has no control over picketing for motives not listed in the Taft-
Hartley Act.
65. "... [T]he court reasoned that the union was attempting to force petitioners
to violate Section 6 (c) of the [Pennsylvania] statute, which provides that 'It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (c) By discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization . . .'" 346 U. S. 485, 487. Compare
Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor or-
ganization . . ."
66. "The court finds that the picketing was peaceful. The conclusion of the
court is not based on a holding that the objective of the pickets was unlawful under
state law or that the objective ran counter to the established public policy of the
state .. ."
"Our conclusion is grounded on the finding that the picketing labor organizations
have committed an unfair labor practice under the N. L. R.A., as amended, and on
the holding that a court of equity of this state has jurisdiction to enjoin such practice.
Thee- is no question here of a common law right . . ." Supra note 43,
67. Benetar and Isaacs, Pickets or- Balfattf The New Trend in Labor Low;
40 A.B. A. J. 84852 (1954).
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In conclusion, it should be pointed out that there are no
decisions which specifically authorize the point of view as to state
jurisdiction here proposed. On the other hand, there are no deci-
sions which seem to deny it, and it would seem that unless a
similar plan is adopted by the courts Congress will be forced to
enact a statatory basis which would at least allow the statecourts
to take what the Board refuses. In any ease, clarifying legisla-
tion in this field is badly needed, in view of the prevailing theory
that the doctrine of federal pre-emption denies to the states any
right at all over interstate businesses with labor:problems..
John P. MacArthur
